There are already 130,000 fewer international students in the US. Has anyone noticed?

SEVIS data indicate international student enrollment has dropped 11% since March 2024, before accounting for NSF and NIH cuts and expected new travel restrictions.

I analyzed data from the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and what I found shocked me, in part, because the Institute for International Education (IIE) continues to predict a 3% increase in international student enrollment for 2024/25.

It’s hard to square a “steady growth” outlook with what I’m seeing in the SEVIS data.

I ran an analysis that compares SEVIS data from a year ago, March 2024, to the most recent data, March 2025.¹

This is not what might happen. This is what has already happened over the last 12 months before the impacts of cuts to NSF and NIH, visa revocations, and expected new travel restrictions have shown up in the data. We will have to wait for April, May, and June – and next August and September – to see signs of their impact on international student enrollment.

To be clear, the current year-over-year decline is a reflection of an enrollment cycle that began under the Biden administration, so the March 2025 numbers have yet to reflect any impacts of policies implemented under the second Trump administration.

The numbers suggest that last year’s spring graduates (2023/24) were not replenished with new fall enrollments (2024/25) in language training or associates, bachelor's, master's, and doctorate programs. This is evident when the total international students of 1,153,169 (March 2024) began to drop to 1,114,290 (June 2024) after spring graduation, then dropped significantly at the beginning of the fall of this academic year, 1,022,510 (September 2024) and remained stable to the current 1,022,545 (March 2025) enrollment numbers.

The dramatic shift in international student enrollment has the potential to reshape American higher education in ways that would be difficult to reverse.

I don't think this is just another cyclical fluctuation—but rather a more fundamental restructuring that will have profound implications for university finances, research output, and America's position in the global knowledge economy.

This isn't just another cyclical fluctuation—we're witnessing a fundamental restructuring that will have profound implications for university finances, research output, and America's position in the global knowledge economy.

The Headline Numbers

The overall decline of -11.33% (-130,624 active students) from March 2024 (1,153,169) to March 2025 (1,022,545) is remarkable in both scale and speed.

For context, this represents a potential revenue loss of up to $4 billion for U.S. institutions in a single year, assuming average tuition and living expenses of around $30,000 per student.

Current trends are approaching the dramatic 15% drop during COVID-19.

The overall decline of -11.33% (-130,624 active students) from March 2024 to March 2025 is remarkable in both scale and speed... This represents a revenue loss potentially exceeding $4 billion for U.S. institutions in a single year.

But the aggregate numbers mask the most important story.

This isn't an across-the-board decline—it's a complex reconfiguration of student flows that signals deeper structural shifts in international student mobility to the US.

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US-India Mobility in Flux?

The most dramatic shift is the 27.90% decline in Indian students (-98,853) alongside a 3.28% increase in Chinese students (+8,364). This has returned China to its historical position as the top sender of international students to the US.

Early warning signs of this enrollment drop were visible in visa issuance data. Between January and September 2024, F-1 visas issued to Indian students fell to 63,973—a 38% decline from the 103,000 issued during the same period in 2023. Simultaneously, global student visa denial rates (October 2023 to September 2024) reached a 10-year high of 41%, continuing an update trend from 15% in 2000 and 25% in 2015.

The implications are significant.

Indian students have traditionally clustered in STEM fields, particularly computer science and engineering master's programs. Their decline partly explains why master's programs saw a –20.52% enrollment drop while bachelor's programs remained stable (–0.43%).

Growth from Saudi Arabia (+13.50%) reflects renewed government scholarship programs and strategic investments in human capital from these countries. These are policy decisions, not market-driven trends.

Here are the trends for the top 10 countries:

What explains this divergence? A number of factors are at play:

• Affordability: Indian students are typically more price-sensitive and ROI-focused than their Chinese counterparts. As U.S. visa policies have tightened and post-graduation work opportunities have become less certain, many Indian students have redirected to Canada, Australia, and the UK, where pathways to permanent residency are clearer.

• Alternative destinations: Canada has been particularly aggressive in attracting Indian students with a nearly tenfold increase over the past decade, from just over 27,000 in 2011 to nearly 220,000 by the end of 2021. The UK remains the most attractive destination for Chinese students, as immigration policies and political uncertainties have softened the popularity of the US as a destination.

• Geopolitical tensions: U.S.-India ties have faced new frictions over visa processing times, OPT extensions, and H-1B policies. Heightened scrutiny of Chinese students in sensitive STEM fields and concerns over intellectual property theft have contributed to a decline in Chinese student enrollment and a shift toward alternative destinations like the UK and Canada.

As I explained in A Tale of Two Reports: Contradictions in International Student Mobility in the Trump 2.0 Era, the outlook painted by IIE Open Doors (which garners all the headlines in major media outlets) masked the important on-the-ground data collected by NAFSA and Study Portals in the Global Enrolment Benchmark Survey.

Master's Degree Drop

Master's programs have become the financial engine for many universities, with international students often paying full tuition without institutional aid. The -20.52% decline (-106,158 students) in master’s enrollment represents a potential revenue shortfall of over $3 billion concentrated in specific departments and institutions.

More importantly, as I’ve argued, international graduate students aren't supplemental income—they're critical scientific infrastructure. They don't merely augment American scientific leadership—in many critical domains, they constitute it.

And, to be clear, they’re more, so much more—human beings who enrich our societies, campuses, and culture.

The enrollment declines are uneven across US states.

Overall, 11 states showed increases in international student enrollment while 39 states, plus DC and other territories, experienced declines.

All top 10 states experienced decreases in international student enrollment, with Texas seeing the largest decline (15,064 students, 16.48%) due to the disproportionate number of students from India compared to the national average.

States like Michigan (-15.48%), Illinois (-15.03%), Ohio (-12.80%), and Florida (-10.03%) have also been hit hard. States like California have been more resilient (-2.27%) due to the disproportionate number of students from Eastern Asia.

The increases were predominantly concentrated in smaller, rural states with historically lower international student populations.

The top 5 states that saw the largest percentage increases in international student enrollment were Wyoming (+8.7%), Vermont (+6.2%), New Hampshire (+4.9%), Maine (+4.3%), and Montana (+3.8%).

What distinguishes these states?

Smaller baseline enrollments and a significantly lower cost of living than cities like Boston and New York, which matters for the growing number of price-sensitive international students. Universities in these states have also benefited from strategic investments in specialized academic programs and targeted institutional partnerships with countries showing overall growth.

They are located in states that rank among the safest in terms of overall violent crime rates, which is reassuring for parents who have growing concerns about gun violence in the US.

Geopolitical Shifts

The regional patterns are telling:

• Southern Asia: -26.88% (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal)

• Western Africa: -21.33% (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Cameroon)

• Western Europe: +10.35% (UK, France, Germany, Spain)

• Eastern Asia: +3.27% (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan)

These shifts map onto changing global economic and political realignments, although new tariffs might exacerbate relationships with traditional US allies.

European students are returning to U.S. universities after a pandemic-induced absence, while students from developing economies are increasingly sensitive to cost-benefit calculations.

Looming Travel Restrictions

Information that is available about potential new travel restrictions would affect citizens from up to 43 countries across three tiers of restrictions in three levels:

• RED Category (Complete Ban), including students from Afghanistan, Iran, etc.

• ORANGE Category (Higher Scrutiny), including students from Haiti, Laos, etc.

• YELLOW Category (Probationary), including students from Pakistan, etc.

It is not clear if, or when, it might go into effect, or the final list of countries, or the nature of each category. But, if the publicly available information is accurate, this could affect approximately 30,000 international students, according to my estimates.

While this number is modest in the big scheme of things, the impact would be significant for universities and currently enrolled students from these countries:

• Iran (10,236 students) would be particularly affected, with over 7,000 doctoral students potentially unable to continue their studies if they travel outside the U.S.

• Pakistan (9,975 students) could face restrictions after a 60-day review period.

The direct numerical impact is less important than the signaling effect.

Even students from non-affected countries will perceive greater uncertainty about studying in the U.S., accelerating the diversification of destination countries for globally mobile students.

Research Funding Cliff

While visa restrictions and policy shifts contribute to enrollment declines, a potentially more consequential factor looms large: the dramatic reduction in federal research funding. This represents not merely a budget adjustment but a fundamental restructuring of American scientific capacity, as I outlined in “America’s Scientific Surrender: Is the U.S. Throwing its Talent Advantage Down the Drain?”

The numbers are startling:

• NSF budget: reduced from $9 billion to $3 billion (a 66.7% cut)

• NIH indirect cost recovery: slashed from 69% to 15% (a 78.3% reduction)

These cuts strike at the heart of graduate education funding, particularly for international students. Federal funding serves as the primary support for 5% of STEM master's students and 26% of STEM doctoral students. Among federally supported students, 69% receive research assistantships funded by federal grants.

By field, the potential impact on international student enrollment is striking:

• Engineering: 21,000-34,000 students

• Computer/Information Sciences: 8,700-16,300 students

• Biological/Biomedical Sciences: 8,900-12,900 students

• Physical Sciences: 6,400-8,700 students

• Mathematics/Statistics: 4,400-6,000 students

Overall, I currently estimate between 50,000 and 77,000 international STEM graduate students could be affected—approximately 10% of the total international STEM graduate population. This is particularly significant considering that temporary visa holders are more likely than U.S. citizens to rely on research assistantships (52% vs. 34%) according to the most recent NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates.

Several important dynamics are at play:

1. Research universities will bear the brunt. R1 institutions host approximately 70% of international STEM graduate students and receive the bulk of federal research funding. The impact will vary by institution—MIT's federal funding dependency (52% of revenues) is higher than Harvard's (11%).

2. Global competition for talent is intensifying. As the U.S. reduces support, competing nations are implementing aggressive strategies to attract this talent. Canada's "Tech Talent Strategy" directly targets U.S.-based international talent with streamlined work permits. The UK's "High-Potential Individual" visa specifically targets graduates from prestigious universities.

3. Universities will adjust, but more permanently. Unlike temporary measures during the 2013 sequestration, universities will likely view these changes as permanent shifts in the funding landscape. They're already implementing structural budget adjustments rather than stopgap measures.

The most concerning aspect is the multiplicative effect when combined with visa restrictions, enrollment declines, and growing international competition.

Each factor alone might be manageable, but together they represent a potential inflection point for American scientific leadership.

What I'm Watching

Several indicators will signal whether this is a temporary dislocation or a permanent restructuring:

1. The June SEVIS numbers. Will there be another sharp drop from March 2025 to June 2025 as there was from March 2024 to June 2024?

2. Indian student numbers for Fall 2025. The true signal isn't just total numbers but distribution patterns. Watch for asymmetric recovery, with elite institutions maintaining Indian enrollment while regional universities continue losing ground.

3. Chinese undergraduate-to-graduate ratios. The interesting dynamic isn't just whether Chinese students come to America, but at what level. An increasing undergraduate-to-graduate ratio would suggest that Chinese families still value American undergraduate education.

4. University financial responses. Watch for hiring freezes, program closures, and tuition increases at public universities in the hardest-hit states. This Google Sheet is tracking this trend in the biomedical sciences, and it’s likely one of many such efforts to track the impacts of the dramatic cuts to science.

5. How will universities adapt and innovate? The most interesting signal will be where different universities redirect resources. Will they invest in online programs for international markets? Focus on satellite campuses abroad? Other innovative approaches? These strategic pivots tell us more than cost-cutting, as they’ll signal where universities think future potential lies.

In the meantime, there is still time for policymakers to act.

When the Open Doors Report is released each November, the headlines have become almost as predictable as sunny weather in Southern California – “all time highs”! ☀️

We don't need to wait for November to see the warning signs. The data on the dashboard are flashing red before our eyes.

The headline writes itself, “International Student Enrollment Plummets 11%: SEVIS Data Shows $4 Billion Revenue Loss for U.S. Higher Education”

And remember, this is not speculation. The decline started after the spring 2024 graduation last year – and will likely increase once NIH/NSF cuts and the impact of any new travel restrictions, etc. are evident.

I hope some journalist, congressional aide, or someone with more influence than me sees these numbers and runs them independently to inform policymakers about what's at stake before it’s too late.

There’s still time to act. But the window is closing.

Download the data and see for yourself:

SEVIS March 2024

SEVIS March 2025

What do you see?

Tell me what you think:

• What SEVIS data point surprises you most?

• Are you seeing different recruitment patterns at your institution this year?

• Anything I didn't mention that you want to add?

• If these trends continue, what do you expect your institution will do?

Share your thoughts in the comments below.

1. A few weeks after this article was posted, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) removed the SEVIS data from December 2022 to March 2025 from its accessible Data Mapping Tool website, labeling it “under review” but without further explanation. The removed data remains available on the Internet Archive Wayback Machine if you click on April 21, 2025.